Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered is a pleasing culmination of Stephanie Ruphy's pioneering and underappreciated philosophical work. She gives careful and sympathetic critiques of various monist and pluralist positions and advances her own synthesis of 'foliated pluralism' supported by perceptive and measured arguments. This book deserves to be read by all practice-oriented philosophers of science.
Ruphy offers the first comprehensive introduction to debates about pluralism in philosophy of science. She succeeds not only in providing a clear overview of the field but also in advancing current debates about the methodological and ontological dimensions of scientific pluralism.
This outstanding book will become an indispensable resource for students and researchers alike. Cover Image. Introduction [PDF]. This will set the standard for future scholarship on both Rosenzweig and Christian-Jewish dialogue. This book will set the standard for future scholarship on both Rosenzweig and Christian-Jewish dialogue. This book, written with philosophical lucidity and moral intensity, will orient discussions of German-Jewish thought for years to come. By identifying his critique of idolatry—characterized by an improper relation to God—to be the subtext informing Rosenzweig's religious vision, Batnitzky not only allows us to unravel his arguments, but also offers a rich array of insights into the religious condition of contemporary Judaism.
He is, in her interpretation, the kind of Jewish conversation partner Christians need—a partner who is both more critical of Christianity and also Jewishly self-critical than has been previously supposed. The book contributes greatly to a welcome turn in Jewish-Christian dialogue which is now in progress.
In this book, Anthony Chemero describes this nonrepresentational approach, puts it in historical and conceptual context, and applies it to traditional problems in the philosophy of mind. Radical embodied cognitive science is a direct descendant of the American naturalist psychology of William James and John Dewey, and follows them in viewing perception and cognition to be understandable only in terms of action in the environment.
Chemero argues that cognition should be described in terms of agent-environment dynamics rather than in terms of computation and representation. After outlining this orientation to cognition, Chemero proposes a methodology: dynamical systems theory, which would explain things dynamically and without reference to representation. He also advances a background theory: Gibsonian ecological psychology, "shored up" and clarified.
Chemero then looks at some traditional philosophical problems through the lens of radical embodied cognitive science and concludes that the comparative ease with which it resolves these problems, combined with its empirical promise, makes this approach to cognitive science a rewarding one. Artificial intelligence research has foundered on the issue of representation.
When intelligence is approached in an incremental manner, with strict reliance on interfacing to the real world through perception and action, reliance on representation disappears. In this paper we outline our approach to incrementally building complete intelligent Creatures.
The fundamental decomposition of the intelligent system is not into independent information processing units which must interface with each other via representations. Instead, the intelligent system is decomposed into independent and parallel activity The notions of central and peripheral systems evaporateeverything is both central and peripheral. Based on these principles we have built a very successful series of mobile robots which operate without supervision as Creatures in standard office environments.
In this book, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition that holds that some kinds of minds -- basic minds -- are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world.
The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of It is a particular way of exploring the environment.
Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency.
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. In treating cognition as problem solving, Andy Clark suggests, we may often abstract too far from the very body and world in which our brains evolved to guide Cognitive representation is the single most important explanatory notion in the sciences of the mind and has served as the cornerstone for the so-called 'cognitive revolution'.
".a superb insightful analysis of the notion of mental representation in cognitive science. The book presents an original argument for a bold conclusion: partial. Cambridge Core - Philosophy of Science - Representation Reconsidered - by William M. Ramsey.
This book critically examines the ways in which philosophers and cognitive scientists appeal to representations in their theories, and argues that there is considerable confusion about the nature of representational states. This has led to an excessive over-application of the notion - especially in many of the fresher theories in computational neuroscience. Representation Reconsidered shows It is also generally understood to bear intentionality i. Traditionally, visual mental imagery, the most discussed variety, was thought A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn.
Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre he His arguments in defense of these views are rebutted in detail, and the traditional, passive, Cartesian view of visual perception, upon which several of them implicitly rely, is criticized in the light of findings from recent cognitive science and neuroscience.
It is also argued that the apparent intuitiveness of the passive view of visual perception is a result of mere historical contingency.
An understanding of perception informed by modern visual science as an inherently active process enables us to unify our accounts of perception, mental imagery, dreaming, hallucination, creativity, and other aspects of imagination within a single coherent theoretical framework. How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness?
We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do We are additionally able to explain why different sensory feels differ in the way they do.
Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior.
In this paper We suggest that so far, at least, the sceptical rhetoric outpaces both evidence and argument. Some probable causes of this premature scepticism are isolated.