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Published by Free Press, New York Ships from the UK. Alan F.
Editor ; Contributors:Koenig, Louis W. Highlighter markings. Book shows common average signs of wear and use. Binding is still tight. Covers are intact but may be repaired.
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Published by Free Press About this Item: Free Press, Condition: UsedGood. Trade paperback, fading, light wear to exterior; some underlining; firm binding. Published by Henry Regnery Company About this Item: Henry Regnery Company, Pages tanned. Covers slightly scuffed otherwise Good.
With various Republican Senators accusing Senate Democrats of delaying the Bork hearings, Senator Dole offered as "food for thought" the possibility of President Reagan making a recess appointment of Judge Bork during Congress's August recess. Additional CRS reports provide information and analysis related to other stages of the confirmation process for nominations to the Supreme Court. Such secrecy may allow a President to reflect on the qualifications of prospective nominees, and the background investigations to proceed, away from the glare of publicity, news media coverage, and outside political pressures. These statutory authorities began to pile up—and because presidents had little incentive to terminate states of emergency once declared, these piled up too. Bush's first two Supreme Court selections were not made immediately upon the heels of a Justice's retirement announcement: President Bush announced his choice of John G.
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Please contact us with any queries. Seller Inventory ZZ3. Steve Allen William F. Buckley, Jr.
Published by Henry Regnery Co. About this Item: Henry Regnery Co. Satisfaction Guaranteed! Book is in Used-Good condition. Pages and cover are clean and intact. Used items may not include supplementary materials such as CDs or access codes. May show signs of minor shelf wear and contain limited notes and highlighting. Published by Pranava Books About this Item: Pranava Books, Condition: NEW.
Condition: New. Reprinted from edition. NO changes have been made to the original text.
This is NOT a retyped or an ocr'd reprint. Illustrations, Index, if any, are included in black and white. Each page is checked manually before printing. As this print on demand book is reprinted from a very old book, there could be some missing or flawed pages, but we always try to make the book as complete as possible. In Popular Justice: Presidential Prestige and Executive Success in the Supreme Court, Jeff Yates is interested in determining the extent to which the Supreme Court defers to the president or the executive branch in litigation.
While there is a considerable body of research examining various aspects of the presidency-Supreme Court relationship, most of the work has been qualitative analyses of highly salient cases or descriptive statistical examinations of federal agency success. Professor Yates provides the first comprehensive and systematic empirical analysis of executive success in the Court. Additionally, this is the first empirical work that includes "presidential prestige" as an important explanatory variable in defining the extent to which the president will be successful in gaining support for his views in the Court.
Drawing on research indicating that the Supreme Court is responsive to public opinion, Yates hypothesizes that public support for the president will translate into increased success rates for the executive branch. Presidential prestige has been an important factor in the executive-congressional relationship, and Yates asks the question, "Are Supreme Court justices responsive to presidential prestige in their choice to support the president and his policies?
This is the guiding research question around which he builds his theoretical models. The book is developed along three lines of inquiry focusing on the primary points of interaction between the presidency and the Court involving litigation. The first empirical chapter analyzes whether public approval encourages Supreme Court support for litigants seeking increases in formal presidential power. Utilizing theoretical premises from the presidential and judicial politics literature, Yates develops an empirical model that incorporates attitudinal, political, and external factors, like public approval, into an analysis of Supreme Court support for presidential power.
Consistent with the literature, he finds that the ideology of the justice is an important determinant of the vote, and the type of presidential power, i. Moreover, and the important new contribution of the analysis, is that even when controlling for attitudinal and political variables, the level of presidential approval and prestige is a significant determinant of Court support for presidential power.
One could argue that high-profile cases involving a request to expand formal presidential powers would be more vulnerable to the variables in Yates's model. This leads him to examine the other two points of interaction in two succeeding empirical chapters. Chapter 4 analyzes the success of federal bureaucratic agencies in the Supreme Court, and chapter 5 examines the ability of the president to influence Supreme Court outcomes by signaling policy preferences to the justices in issue areas that commonly attract the attention of the executive.
In his analysis of federal agency success, Yates argues that it is possible for the president to politicize the federal bureaucracy and use it to achieve aspects of his political agenda. An unknown error has occurred.